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Abstract: In the last decade, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI) has grown in both popularity and influence. The ascendance of EITI is 
surprising because traditionally, leaders of resource-rich states prefer to tightly 
control their extractive industries. This paper investigates the underlying causes of 
EITI membership in order to understand its acceptance, even among some of the 
most authoritarian regimes. The paper argues that leaders of resource-rich countries 
use the EITI to consolidate their international prestige as eager reformers, which 
serves to both maintain and lure foreign investment. The cross-national and 
interrupted time series analyses reveal that EITI members not only have higher FDI 
levels compared to non-members, but these investments increase once countries 
join the initiative.  
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To Disclose or not to Disclose: How Global Competition for Foreign Direct 
Investment Influences Transparency Reforms in Extractive Industries 
 
1. Introduction	
 
Since Tony Blair launched the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 
2003, 51 resource-rich countries have become members to this public-private partnership, 
which seeks to promote revenue transparency in the extractive industries. The EITI 
membership now includes important producers of hydrocarbons and minerals such as 
Iraq, Kazakhstan, and Nigeria. As EITI members, these countries voluntarily disclose 
their financial transactions with foreign companies in the extractive industries. The 
growing popularity of the EITI is remarkable and puzzling at the same time. 
Traditionally, leaders of resource-rich states tightly control their extractive sector due to 
its strategic importance for the economy. Methods of ‘control’ may involve stealthy 
contracts, preferential treatments, and off-the-books financial transactions, which are 
naturally kept hidden from the public eye. Yet an increasing number of resource-rich 
states also endorse the EITI process of disclosing revenues from the sale of hydrocarbons 
and minerals despite the potential political costs of transparency.  
To understand the reasons of EITI’s popularity, even among some of the most 
authoritarian regimes, this paper problematizes the underlying causes of EITI 
membership. So far, the literature on resource governance does not offer a systematic 
analysis of why governments would voluntarily disclose revenues from extractive 
industries. Contributing to the literatures on transparency and policy diffusion, the 
analysis in this paper shows that the decision to join the EITI is partly motivated by 
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global competition for foreign direct investment. Specifically, based on series of logistic 
regressions, the research reveals that states that depend on foreign direct investment 
(FDI) for economic growth are more likely to be affiliated with the initiative. In addition, 
an interrupted time-series analysis shows that EITI-implementing countries experience 
higher levels of incoming FDI immediately following their membership. The results 
confirm that leaders of resource-rich countries use the EITI to consolidate their 
international prestige as eager reformers, which serves to maintain and/or lure foreign 
investment. Compliance with the EITI standard is an effective signal for countries to 
demonstrate their willingness to embrace open markets, which also explains the growing 
popularity of the initiative. 
The paper is organized as follows: the first section focuses on the emergence of 
the norm of transparency in extractive industries and the EITI process. The next section 
analyses the reasons why countries might join the EITI, focusing particularly on material 
processes identified by the policy diffusion literature. The following sections present the 
model and the statistical analysis. The last section discusses the implications of the results 
for transparency promotion in resource-rich countries.  
2. Promoting Transparency in Extractive Industries  
 
Revenue Transparency became a global norm in extractive industries thanks to the efforts 
of various advocacy networks, including Revenue Watch (RW) and Publish What You 
Pay (PWYP), who made constant efforts to highlight transparency as a remedy for 
corruption and mismanagement in the resource sector. In the early 2000s, these groups 
began to lobby international oil companies to disclose their receipts from host countries. 
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In response to these demands, British Petroleum (BP) published a bonus payment of $111 
million to the Angolan government for an offshore license in 2001. The subsequent the 
backlash from the Angolan government at the time highlighted the collective action 
problem faced by multinational companies and eventually inspired the creation of the 
EITI in 2003.1  
What does transparency imply for resource-rich countries? In the extractive 
industries, transparency broadly refers to public availability of information on how 
resources are managed, and applies particularly to public revenues, expenditures, 
awarding of contracts and licenses, public procurement, politician’s personal wealth, 
appointments and promotions, clarity of roles and responsibilities, and open budget 
processes (IMF, 2007; Kolstad & Wiig, 2009, p. 526).  
In theory, transparency has substantial political costs (Berliner, 2014) because it 
can make corruption riskier for those in power by allowing the public to monitor resource 
management and by initiating a fair selection process for the resource bureaucracy. Yet, 
leaders might tolerate certain transparency reforms when there is strong political 
competition (Hollyer, Rosendorff, & Vreeland, 2011) or a possibility of government 
turnover (Berliner, 2014). In certain cases, even authoritarian governments can favor 
transparency to improve local governance and efficiency (Lorentzen, 2014). However in 
resource-rich countries the existence of easy access to rents removes the necessity of such 
gestures. Leaders of these countries often prefer a secretive business environment that 
permits unfair access to rents and undermines incentives for institutional reform. As a 
result, the majority of resource-rich countries currently have non-transparent commercial 
                                                
1 Interview with Dr. Francisco Paris, EITI Regional Director, 10 May 2011, Oslo. 
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relations and suffer from high levels of corruption (Revenue Watch, 2013; World Bank, 
2013).  
In this context, it is not surprising that transparency advocates in resource-rich 
countries presume a possible causal relationship between transparency and corruption. 
However, this relationship is yet to be empirically demonstrated and studies on 
transparency’s impact on corruption reveal conflicting results. On one hand, various 
works highlight the positive aspects of transparency. For example Islam (2006) shows 
that countries with better informational flows also have higher governance levels. 
Similarly, when transparency is measured by the freedom of information, a negative 
correlation exists between corruption and transparency (Brunetti & Weder, 2003).  
On the other hand, partial implementation of transparency may undermine its 
alleged positive impact on good governance. For example, making only revenues 
transparent might not address corruption in resource-rich countries, where off-the-books 
payments to government officials are not likely to be reported (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009, p. 
525; Öge, 2014, 2016). Similarly, Fox (2007) distinguishes between clear and opaque 
transparency where the latter conceals the actual mechanisms of the decision-making 
process and reveals only to the extent demanded by international institutions. This 
opaque form of transparency, such as disclosing only aggregate data on resource 
revenues as opposed to individual receipts from each company, is not likely to have a 
moderating impact on corruption.  
While the actual impact of transparency on good governance is open to debate, 
currently the norm is more popular than ever (EITI, 2014b). Yet, many developing 
countries lack the necessary mechanisms and/or incentives to ensure that the resource 
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management process is transparent. In such contexts, external influences can play a 
significant role in transparency promotion. Firstly, international financial institutions 
(IFIs) increasingly use technical assistance to help key actors internalize the norm of 
transparency. For example, the World Bank helps local civil society groups to improve 
their monitoring skills. Similarly, the IMF published its “Guide on Resource Revenue 
Transparency” in 2007, which provides references of good and best practices of resource 
revenue transparency, as a guideline for both governments and civil society groups (IMF, 
2007, p. vii). Secondly, transnational advocacy networks (TANs), such as PWYP, RW, 
and Transparency International (TI), help establish domestic civil society coalitions to 
push for more transparency in the management of resource revenues. Building up on the 
success of these networks, the EITI has been the most influential organization to promote 
revenue transparency in the last decade. 
 
3. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
 
The EITI is a coalition of countries, companies, and civil society groups that aims to 
establish global standards of transparency in extractive industries. The membership of the 
EITI increased consistently since it was launched in 2003, following the international 
support it received from the United Kingdom and the World Bank. As of April 2016, 51 
resource-rich countries implement the EITI standard (EITI, 2013b).  
The wide popularity of the EITI among resource-rich countries is partially due to 
its status as a public-private entity. The stakeholders of the EITI include affluent 
governments such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Qatar, the United States, which 
provide political, technical, and financial support to the initiative, but are not necessarily 
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EITI-implementing countries; global advocacy networks; and international companies 
including BP, Chevron, and ExxonMobil. Companies, in particular, are key actors in the 
EITI process. Currently more than 90 largest oil gas and mining companies officially 
support the EITI process. In certain cases, companies have played crucial roles in 
convincing resource-rich governments to implement the EITI standard. For example, 
ExxonMobil was instrumental in Equatorial Guinea’s accession to the EITI (Committee, 
2008). Similarly, BP was key to Azerbaijan’s membership and Shell in Nigeria has 
actively supported the country’s EITI membership since 2002 (Aaronson, 2011).   
The EITI also established partnerships with the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Asian 
Development Bank (EITI, 2014f). This multilayered and cosmopolitan structure of the 
initiative allows more flexibility to work with a diverse set of countries and under 
different political environments. Yet, this flexible structure also undermines effective 
implementation of reform because the stakeholders and EITI members have diverging 
interests regarding the goals and the strategy of the initiative. Member governments and 
companies focus on bolstering global credibility, competitiveness, and profitability. On 
the other hand, international organizations and civil society groups focus on issues of 
governance and expect substantial improvements in tax collection processes and the fight 
against corruption (Aaronson, 2011).  
How does the EITI function? The EITI uses a relatively a narrow definition of 
transparency that focuses only on governments’ revenues.  Accordingly, participating oil, 
gas, and mining companies are required to publish what they pay to the governments of 
their host countries and the governments are required to publish what they receive. An 
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independent firm then comparatively audits these published accounts. Subsequently, local 
NGOs assess these reports and offer comments and suggestions for improvements. The 
Multi-Stakeholder Group, composed of designated representatives from the government, 
companies, and civil society groups, supervises this whole process in each EITI country 
(Eigen, 2006). By making the revenues more transparent, the promoters of the EITI 
expect improvements in anti-corruption efforts and tax collection processes. The EITI 
process also anticipates improved trust and stability in the extractive industries, which 
would eventually encourage long-term investments and ensure supply security (EITI, 
2014c).  
The initial blueprints of the EITI included measures to have all oil, natural gas, 
and mineral companies disclose their payments to resource-rich governments.2 However, 
in the current EITI structure, the responsibility to disclose falls mostly on the member 
governments (Frynas, 2010). Companies that operate in EITI-implementing countries are 
required to “disclose all material payments in accordance with the agreed reporting 
templates and in line with the company’s audited figures” and “cooperate to remedy any 
discrepancies identified by the Independent Administrator” (EITI, 2013a). In cases where 
companies fail to report, the host country may lose its compliant status, however, there is 
no formal punishment for the companies.3 
Various major corporations publicly endorse the EITI process and comply with 
their obligations in EITI-implementing states even though they are not legally required to 
do as such. However, they have yet to adopt revenue transparency as a general policy 
                                                
2 Interview with Dr. Francisco Paris, EITI Regional Director, 10 May 2011, Oslo. 
3 In some EITI countries, such as Nigeria and Norway, companies are legally bound to comply with the 
standard (EITI, 2013a). 
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(Frynas, 2010; Ross, 2015). In fact, besides their responsibilities in EITI-members, EITI 
supporting companies such as Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Total rarely disclose their 
payments to governments. A study in 2012 found out that only 17 out of 53 EITI 
supporting companies reported country-payments in a consistent manner (Toledano, 
2012). This outcome once again confirms that the EITI standard applies exclusively to 
resource-rich governments while supporting companies are only asked to disclose when 
the host governments comply with the initiative.  
Despite the substantial influence of the EITI over the resource-rich countries, this 
multifaceted organization remains understudied. A small number of studies focus on the 
general implications of the initiative (Aaronson, 2011). Similarly, reports by international 
observers point out to the challenges the initiative faces and provide suggestions on how 
the EITI should move beyond its given mandate (Dykstra, 2011; Revenue Watch 
Institute, 2006). These are also several single case studies and reports that examine the 
challenges the initiative faces in different political and social contexts (Bagirov, 2007; 
Keblusek, 2010; Öge, 2014; PPRC, 2005). More recently, a number of studies have 
focused on EITI’s impacts on corruption and good governance (Kasekende, Abuka, & 
Sarr, 2016; Öge, 2016; Papyrakis, Rieger, & Gilberthorpe, 2016; Sovacool, Walter, Van 
de Graaf, & Andrews, 2016). To the best of this author’s knowledge, there is only one 
empirical study on the causes of EITI membership; however it focuses mostly on 
corruption as an explanatory mechanism (David-Barrett & Okamura, 2013). The 
literature on compliance so far lacks a viable explanation of why states voluntarily 
disclose their revenues in their strategic industries. The following section discusses the 
mechanisms through which countries decide to adopt revenue transparency.  
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4. Why do countries join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative? 
 
In the literature on democratization, traditionally, endogenous variables take precedence 
as potential causes of domestic reforms (Pevehouse, 2002). Accordingly, a ‘domestic 
push’ for democratization from a grassroots movement is more likely to have an impact 
on the political regime in comparison to an ‘international pull’ (Levitsky & Way, 2006). 
Yet, one can argue that international factors, such as the distribution of economic and 
political power (Gourevitch, 1978), or flow of ideas and norms (Finnemore, 1993; 
Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), can also shape leadership preferences on institutional 
reforms. The new institutionalist tradition offers two logics on how international policies 
can be embraced by decision-makers: the logic of consequences and the logic of 
appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1984).  
The logic of consequences implies that only direct material benefits from future 
compliance would encourage the leadership to reform institutions as demanded by 
international actors. According to this perspective, governments comply with the 
demands of transparency advocates when the costs of compliance are less than the 
benefits. Before making the decision to join the EITI, the political elite evaluates short-
term costs and benefits of EITI compliance, bearing in mind the strategic importance of 
resource revenues for their political success. I identify two mechanisms of policy 
diffusion, which are relevant for the calculation of these costs and benefits as a rational 
process: learning and competition (Graham, Shipan, & Volden, 2013).  
Learning implies that as rational decision-makers, leaders carry out policies for 
their observed, positive results. The primary intended goal of the EITI is to facilitate a 
transparent resource management process. While majority of a country’s citizens might 
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support such an outcome, revenue transparency may not necessarily be in the best 
interests of politicians. The disclosure of government revenues and the subsequent 
monitoring process by civil society groups can threaten existing patronage networks. This 
type of transparency could also raise awareness and mobilize public dissent especially if 
the majority of the population lives in poverty. These political costs of revenue 
transparency can be quite substantial for many non-democracies. As a result, one should 
expect more corrupt governments to actually refrain from the EITI process.   
A second mechanism of policy diffusion that relates to rational decision-making 
is competition. In an increasingly globalized world, states compete with each other to 
demonstrate and signal their hospitability to foreign capital (Elkins & Simmons, 2004). 
The competition to attract FDI is particularly fierce due to its positive impacts on 
employment, technological progress and economic growth (De Soysa & Oneal, 1999; 
Jensen, 2003). This type of competition is essential for resource abundant countries 
because extractive industries often require long-term, capital-intensive investments from 
multinational companies to maintain and increase production levels.  
How does EITI membership relate to FDI? A now rather extensive literature links 
information and uncertainty to international investment (Baker, Bloom, & Davis, 2013; 
Bloom, 2009; Carlsson & Van Damme, 1993; Leblang & Satyanath, 2006; Morris & 
Shin, 1998; Rodrik, 1991). Since, the EITI process increases the amount of available 
information to potential foreign investors, it can have a direct, positive impact on FDI 
levels. Foreign investors, who are typically risk-averse, would be more likely to increase 
their investment levels when they have access to more information and can make long-
term projections. As a result, countries that depend on investment from international 
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companies would be more eager to sign in to the EITI initiative to both maintain and lure 
FDI. 
Another reason why resource-rich countries might join the EITI is to signal their 
commitment to economic liberalization. This would allow them to attract FDI not only in 
the extractive industries but in all sectors of the economy. Signaling norms for potential 
benefits in a competitive environment is commonplace especially when the international 
audience “develops the belief that all desirable types engage in a specified behavior” 
(Hyde, 2011). In the last decade, transparency has become such a desirable norm for 
resource-rich countries.  
 For a resource-rich country, being member to the EITI signals openness, ease of 
business and stability, which are all key considerations for foreign investors. In this 
context, EITI membership signals credibility to all investors and may legitimize the 
operations of multinational companies even if the host government is authoritarian and 
corrupt. This type of signaling is not unique to resource-rich countries. In fact, similar 
processes can be observed in the area of central bank independence (Johnson, 
forthcoming) and electoral monitoring (Hyde, 2011).   
 The two mechanisms of learning and competition describe rational processes. An 
alternative perspective on norm diffusion is offered by the logic of appropriateness. In 
contrast to the logic of consequences, the logic of appropriateness focuses on the 
internalization of norms and the development of political identities and preferences that 
favor institutional change. According to this logic, politicians adopt institutional reforms 
because they believe in their inherent virtue. The logic of appropriateness is mediated by 
norm entrepreneurs (Börzel & Risse, 2003, p. 59), which mobilize and persuade other 
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actors to redefine their interests by using moral arguments. In resource-rich countries, 
transparency advocates or principled issue networks spread the norm of transparency 
across borders. They target both elites and the society at large in order to persuade them 
to reconsider their identities and goals, in a process, which can be defined as socialization 
(Graham et al., 2013).  
The mechanisms via which these two logics often operate are often interrelated 
and take place simultaneously. Leaders, who are rational decision makers and utility 
maximizers, may also genuinely believe in the inherent virtue of reforms. Even within the 
same government, one can find “certain ministers of energy, who are captured by interest 
groups, sitting next to a minister of finance who wants to do the right thing”.4 However, 
for the case of EITI membership, the material factors are likely to precede ideational ones 
due to the immense importance of extractive industries for the survival of political 
leadership in resource-dependent countries. This assumption underlines the importance of 
learning and competition, as rational processes. While many elites within government 
bureaucracies might eventually socialize into transparency as a global norm, the initial 
decision to join the EITI is more likely to be determined by calculations of immediate 
costs and benefits. Based on these discussions, I propose two main hypotheses. First, I 
expect countries to be more open to EITI membership if they have an incentive to 
accommodate foreign capital. Secondly, I expect countries to observe even higher levels 
of FDI in all sectors of the economy once they become members as a consequence of 
increased informational flows and signaling activity. The following section presents the 
model and the data. 
                                                
4 Interview with Dr. Francisco Paris, EITI Regional Director, 10 May 2011, Oslo. 
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4.1 Cross-National Analysis  
 
The cross-national analysis aims to discover the underlying causes of EITI membership, 
which is the dependent variable. The EITI is a dichotomous variable, which takes the 
value “1” if a country has made an official membership application and takes the value 
“0” if not. 46 EITI-implementing countries (both candidate and compliant) as of 
September 2014 are listed in Table 1 and they vary extensively in terms of geographical 
location and level of economic and political development (EITI, 2014a). To be 
compliant, candidate countries are expected to publish detailed, yearly reports on their 
extractive industries, which are closely monitored by independent auditors and civil 
society groups and disseminated via official government websites (EITI, 2013b). 5  
[Table 1 here] 
The first independent variable is corruption (COR). The promoters of the EITI 
presume that revenue transparency will eventually lead to broadscale anti-corruption 
reforms. Based on this logic, one could argue that corrupt governments would rather 
avoid the EITI in order to prevent such reforms. However, the decision to join the EITI 
would actually depend on governments’ perception of the initiative. As the current EITI 
process is only limited to revenue transparency, corrupt countries could still be interested 
in membership if they do not expect the initiative to have any substantial impacts on 
existing corruption networks. In this latter scenario, EITI membership would improve 
governments’ international prestige and attract foreign investment with relatively limited 
political costs. To measure corruption, I use the Worldwide Governance Indicators data, 
                                                
5 Afghanistan, Chad, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, Equatorial Guinea, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Myanmar, Tajikistan, and Liberia are EITI-implementing countries, but they could not be included in the 
regressions due to absence of data.  
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which is a continuous index based on surveys of experts and entrepreneurs. The index 
runs from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher scores associated with lower levels of corruption (World 
Bank, 2013).  
The second independent variable is foreign direct investment (FDI), and it is the 
main variable of interest identified by the mechanism of competition. I expect higher 
percentage ratios of incoming foreign direct investment in the economy to be correlated 
with greater likelihood of EITI membership. To measure this variable, I use foreign 
direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) from World Development Indicators (World 
Bank, 2014). The third independent variable in the main model is economic wealth. I 
expect economic wealth to correlate negatively with EITI membership since poorer 
countries would have more incentives to signal for material gains. To measure income, I 
use a log of GDP per capita (INCOME), which indicates the relative economic 
vulnerability of a country and its dependence on foreign investment (World Bank, 2014). 
Finally, I also include four additional variables (CTR) to control for other 
political, economic, and regional factors. The first additional variable, Voice and 
Accountability (VA), is an indicator for democratic participation. Democracy is known to 
correlate with transparency, economic openness and corruption. If democratic 
governments are more willing to join the EITI, then the coefficients on both the 
corruption and FDI terms might be biased. The VA index, which addresses this issue 
when used as a control variable, runs from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher scores associated with 
higher levels of political liberties (World Bank, 2013).  
Liberalized economies may be keener to join the EITI, perhaps because they are 
already in compliance with certain provisions of the EITI. Hence, the second control 
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variable is economic liberalization (ECOFREE) and it is measured by the index of 
economic freedom (Heritage, 2015), which runs from 0 (least free) to 100 (most free).  
The third control variable is an indicator of natural resource rents. The primary 
implication of transparency promotion is better management of natural resources. 
Therefore, I expect governments to be more eager to join the EITI if their subsoil 
resources make a substantial contribution to their economies. I use total natural 
resources rents (% of GDP) to measure this variable (RENT) (World Bank, 2014).  
Table 1 reveals that many EITI members are from Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Accordingly, the final additional variable one is a dummy for that region (SUBSAH). A 
positive correlation could signal the presence of a geographical diffusion mechanism 
among Sub-Saharan countries in their attitudes towards the initiative.  
All variables reflect scores from 2010, except for the FDI variable, which is 
averaged over seven years (2006-2012) to account for yearly fluctuations and missing 
data. Since the dependent variable takes only ‘0’s and ‘1’s as values, I use logistic 
regression to test the hypotheses above. Based on the variables described, the model can 
be specified as follows: PR (EITI=1 | COR, FDI, INCOME, CTR) = F (β0 + β1 COR+ + β2 FDI + β3 INCOME + CTR) 
, or alternatively: 
PR(𝐸𝐼𝑇𝐼 = 1 |𝐶𝑂𝑅,𝐹𝐷𝐼, 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸,𝐶𝑇𝑅) =  11 +  1𝑒 !! ! !! !"# ! !! !"# ! !! !"#$%& ! !"#  
In accordance with my hypotheses, I expect a negative sign for β3, while the sign 
for β1 will depend on whether or not corrupt governments perceive the EITI as a threat. β2 
will be the coefficient of main interest for the purposes of this paper. A positive sign for 
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β2 would mean that countries that have higher share of FDI inflows in their economies are 
more likely to become EITI members.  
4.2	The	Results	
 
Table 2 reveals the coefficients of the series of logistic regressions based on the model. 
For the first three columns, the case selection includes all countries in the world where 
data was available. The first column shows the results of the basic model with only three 
variables (corruption, FDI, and income). In Column 2, voice and accountability, 
economic freedom, natural resource rents are introduced as control variables. Finally the 
third column includes the dummy variable for Sub-Saharan countries. The last three 
columns repeat this exercise; however, this time the OECD countries are dropped from 
the analysis in order to test the effectiveness of the model without major industrialized, 
rich countries.  
[Table 2 here] 
The results confirm the main hypothesis of this paper on the significance of the 
competition mechanism for non-OECD countries. The FDI, which is the main variable of 
concern, is consistently significant when industrialized countries are dropped from the 
analysis and its coefficients have the expected positive signs in all variations of the 
model. This outcome implies that higher percentage of incoming FDI is actually 
associated with a higher likelihood of EITI membership.  
Table 3 shows the same results with odds ratios instead of logistic regression 
coefficients, which is helpful in interpreting the impact of independent variables on the 
outcome variable. In the first column, we can see that a 1-unit increase in the FDI 
increases the odds of EITI membership by 1.047. The impact of the FDI variable is much 
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higher when the OECD countries are dropped from the model. For example, in Column 
6, a 1-unit increase in FDI increases the odds of EITI membership by 1.153. This 
suggests that the impact of FDI is more profound for lower and middle-income countries. 
[Table 3 here] 
One can understand the relationship between the two variables even better by 
looking at predicted probabilities of EITI membership at given FDI levels while keeping 
other variables at their means.6 Table 4 shows predicted probabilities of EITI for three 
different FDI values. The mean value of FDI for all countries is 6.51 percent. In the first 
column, a 5 percent increase from the mean of FDI raises the likelihood of EITI 
membership by 3.6 percent (0.214 - 0.178). When the FDI rises 10 percent above the 
mean, the model predicts a 7.7 percent increase in the probability of EITI being equal to 
1. As mentioned above, the interaction between the two variables is much stronger when 
OECD countries are removed from the model. For example, in Column 5, a 10 percent 
increase in the mean value of FDI corresponds to a 33.1 percent rise in the prospect of 
EITI membership.  
[Table 4 here] 
Moving on to other variables in Table 2, corruption negatively correlates with the 
EITI and its coefficient is statistically significant in all regressions. The results suggest 
that countries that suffer from corruption are more likely to be EITI members. Similarly, 
the coefficients of the income variable are also significant and have the expected negative 
signs.  
Finally, the control variables are also consistently significant, except for the index 
of economic freedom, ECOFREE, which is not significant in any of the models. These 
                                                
6 These probabilities were calculated by using the margins command in STATA 12.  
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results show that EITI membership is positively correlated with political liberties and 
natural resource rents. Interestingly, the results also reveal that Sub-Saharan countries are 
more likely to become EITI members. Table 5 displays the predicted probabilities of EITI 
membership based on the values of SUBSAH. Accordingly, among non-industrialized 
economies, the likelihood of EITI membership increases by 27.4 percent if a country is 
from Sub-Saharan Africa.  
[Table 5 here] 
4.3	Discussion	
 
Firstly, the results support the hypothesis generated by the competition mechanism, the 
main argument of this paper. Specifically, the analysis establishes that current EITI 
members have higher FDI inflow levels compared to non-member countries. Yet another 
question remains: do FDI levels increase even further after EITI membership?  
In order to address this issue, I employ an interrupted time-series design (ITS), 
which displays the causal impact of an intervention by assigning a cutoff point (Biglan, 
Ary, & Wagenaar, 2000; Gillings, Makuc, & Siegel, 1981; Lewis-Beck & Alford, 1980; 
Linden, 2015; Muller, 2004). This design compares the values of the dependent variable 
on two sides of the cutoff point in order to identify changes in the slope caused by the 
intervention. To measure the impact of EITI membership on FDI levels, I determine the 
cutoff point to be the year a country becomes an EITI member. Naturally, the actual year 
of membership varies for each country. To be able to test the impact of EITI membership 
across cases, I create a rating variable, TIME, which is a running count of integers. For 
each country, the variable takes the value “1” the year of membership and increases by 
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one every year. The count also goes backwards in order to demonstrate the trend in FDI 
levels immediately before membership. This way, the ITS analysis measures the impact 
of EITI membership on FDI levels. The regression equation for this ITS can be expressed 
as follows (Huitema & Mckean, 2000; Linden & Adams, 2011; Simonton, 1977):  
FDIt =  β0 +  β1 TIMEt +  β2 MEMBERt +  β3 TIMEt MEMBERt + εt 
 FDI is the dependent variable, which is measured again by foreign direct 
investment, net inflows (% of GDP) from World Development Indicators (World Bank, 
2014). TIME is a running count of integers as explained above. MEMBER is a dummy 
variable, which takes the value 1 if a country is an EITI member in a given year and 0 if a 
country is not a member yet. The model also includes an interaction of TIME and 
MEMBER. The coefficient for MEMBER (β2) indicates change in FDI levels immediately 
after the intervention. The coefficient of the interaction variable (β3) represents the 
difference in the slope of the outcome variable before and after the intervention, 
identifying longer-term dynamics. Table 6 shows the outcome of the OLS-regression 
based on the ITS model. The only significant variable is the interaction, which suggests 
that the treatment effect is not immediate but it is felt over time (Linden, 2015). The 
positive value of this coefficient implies that incoming FDI levels are significantly higher 
in the period after membership.  
[Table 6 here] 
The graphical presentation is perhaps the most direct way to demonstrate this 
outcome (Jacob, Zhu, Somers, & Bloom, 2012). Accordingly, Figure 1 shows the 
relationship between the dependent variable and TIME and for all EITI members. The 
variable TIME permits us to visualize the relationship between FDI and EITI affiliation 
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as if all countries became members in the same year. The graph demonstrates that overall 
levels of FDI inflows are higher after membership as previously shown by the regression 
analysis.  
[Figure 1 here] 
In ITS analysis, using a control group of non-EITI members is a common method 
to provide additional validity to the results. However, since membership date among EITI 
countries is not uniform, it is not possible to set a cut-off point for the members of the 
control group. Alternatively, Figure 2 shows FDI levels for non-EITI resource-rich 
countries between 2006 and 2013, a period in which most current EITI-affiliated 
countries have became members. The graph actually reveals a declining trend among 
these countries in terms of the ratio of incoming foreign investment in the economy. This 
outcome confirms the lack of an exogenous intervention, which could have distorted the 
results of the ITS analysis. It also validates the fact that EITI-accession has a significant 
impact on FDI levels among resource-rich countries. In sum, the ITS analysis shows that 
EITI members not only have higher FDI levels compared to non-members, but these 
investments increase further once countries join the initiative.   
[Figure 2 here] 
The results re-confirm the presence of signaling and the validity of the 
competition mechanism. When countries seek to attract FDI for economic growth and 
employment, they are also expected to demonstrate their willingness to accommodate 
foreign capital by liberalizing their institutions. As a result, the presence of multinationals 
in resource-rich countries increases leadership incentives to apply for EITI membership 
since most of these companies are EITI stakeholders. Currently, Chevron operates in 20 
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EITI implementing countries, Glencore in 13, Total in 12, Shell in 10, BP in 8 and Rio 
Tinto in 7 (EITI, 2014f).  
It is important to note that the norm of transparency impacts not only resource-
rich countries but also corporations. In fact, many international companies are pressured 
by their home states to disclose their payments to foreign governments through measures 
such as the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States or the Accounting Directives in the EU 
(Bleischwitz, 2014; Hall, 2013). Interestingly, while companies lobby extensively against 
these national legislations, they are generally supportive of the EITI process. 
Corporations prefer the EITI’s non-binding, voluntary approach to transparency as 
opposed to more strict national legislations, which can undermine their competitiveness. 
In addition, by supporting the EITI process, multinational companies present themselves 
as norm-promoters and aim to improve their popular image (Gillies, 2010). These 
reputational gains are important for high-profile companies who often come under 
intense scrutiny for their operations in developing countries.  
It is important to note that competition for global capital may not be correlated 
with good governance under all circumstances. Unlike Western countries, Russia and 
China have strictly business-related agendas, and they are often indifferent to good 
governance in their supplier states (Taylor, 2006; Zweig & Jianhai, 2005). These 
diverging perspectives often bring international actors at odds with each other on high-
profile cases of human rights abuse. For example, OECD governments severely criticized 
national oil companies (NOCs) from China, India, and Malaysia during the 2000s for 
prioritizing their business interests despite the ongoing humanitarian crises in Burma and 
Sudan (Barnes & Jaffe, 2006, p. 14). The competition of Western countries with Russia 
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and China over the control of limited energy resources and routes can have a direct 
impact on the quality of institutions in resource-rich states (Öge, 2015). In particular, 
countries that have closer commercial interactions with NOCs from Non-Western states 
will have fewer incentives to be more transparent (Chen & Jaffe, 2007). Further research 
could shed more light into the relationship between different sources of FDI and 
transparency.   
Secondly, another interesting result is the tendency among Sub-Saharan African 
countries to be EITI members. This outcome may signify the existence of a geographical 
diffusion mechanism in the region. Gold-rich Ghana and oil-rich Nigeria were the first 
African countries that participated in the initiative, yet they were quickly followed by 
Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Gabon, Guinea, Mauritania and Niger (EITI, 2014d). EITI 
Regional Director Francisco Paris highlights the importance of regional effects during the 
compliance process: “In a francophone African country, they [the EITI representatives] 
were very intrigued by the fact that Central African Republic was able to comply. They 
were asking why they could not comply, yet Central African Republic could.”7 More in 
depth studies are required to substantiate the causal mechanism of geographical diffusion 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. A common theme among the early adopters is the presence of 
Western foreign companies in the extractive sector; however there is no single energy or 
mining company that is responsible for the outcome.  
Thirdly, the results in this research show that countries, which suffer from 
corruption, are also more likely to be EITI members. At first glance, this outcome 
appears counterintuitive. In theory, at least, corrupt governments should have no 
                                                
7 Interview with Dr. Francisco Paris, EITI Regional Director, 10 May 2011, Oslo. 
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incentives to join the EITI since transparency can uncover illegal and corrupt activities, 
which may implicate government officials. However, given the narrow definition of 
transparency in the EITI process, many leaders perceive the associated costs of 
compliance as acceptable. Eager to improve their international image and attract foreign 
investment, these countries are able to sign on to the EITI without necessarily changing 
their usual modus operandi. Thus they implement a limited form of revenue transparency, 
while still keeping a tight lid on how these revenues are spent (Öge, 2014, 2016). Finally, 
the results also reveal that low-income countries are more likely to be EITI members. 
Here, the main implication is that poorer countries have more incentives to signal their 
compliance with global standards of transparency in order to attract FDI, which is 
associated with higher economic growth (De Soysa & Oneal, 1999).  
How to interpret countries that do not fit the model? Table 7 displays a list of 
countries and their predicted probabilities of EITI membership based on the complete 
model.8 Accordingly, the United States, Norway, and Seychelles emerge as unexpected 
EITI countries. For instance, the model predicts that there is 1 percent probability for the 
United States to be an EITI member. Similarly, Norway’s predicted probability of EITI 
membership is only 2 percent. As high income, well-governed countries with limited 
inflows of FDI, there is little expectation for the United States and Norway to be 
affiliated with the initiative. In that sense, they are clearly outliers. However, since both 
countries are important producers of hydrocarbons, their membership has a symbolic 
meaning. As exemplary cases of resource-led economic development, these countries 
make EITI membership more compelling to other developing resource-rich countries. 
Since Norway and the United States already have high standards of resource governance, 
                                                
8 These probabilities were calculated by using the predict command in STATA 12. 
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there is also no political cost of membership. Other industrialized countries such as the 
United Kingdom and Germany, have joined the initiative since September 2014, and 
Canada and Australia may follow suit in the near future to setup examples for other 
resource-rich states.   
[Table 7 here] 
 
The case of Seychelles is perhaps more interesting. At the moment, the scarcely 
populated archipelago does not produce hydrocarbons or minerals; however, international 
oil companies are exploring the potential of offshore petroleum reserves (EITI, 2014e). 
As a country highly dependent on foreign direct investment, the decision of the African 
nation to join the initiative underlines the argument of this paper with regards to the 
competition mechanism. Alternatively, a potential geographical diffusion mechanism in 
Sub-Saharan Africa may have also contributed to the unlikely membership of Seychelles 
to the EITI. 
Finally, how to evaluate countries that have not joined the initiative? The EITI has 
been quite successful in attracting small and medium level hydrocarbon-rich countries. 
However, with the exception of the United States, major players in global energy markets 
have not shown any interest in the initiative. For example, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran and 
China, which collectively produce approximately a third of world’s oil and gas output, 
are not EITI members (EIA, 2016). While more in-depth research is required to 
understand why these countries did not pursue EITI membership, the model here can 
offer some insights. Firstly, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran and China all have low levels of 
FDI inflows (World Bank, 2014), confirming the predictions of my main hypothesis. 
Furthermore, unlike the United States, these countries exercise substantial control over 
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their extractive industries through established state-owned enterprises. Finally, also 
consistent with my model, these countries have upper middle income levels with the sole 
exception of Iran, which has been suffering from economic sanctions until recently. 
These three factors reduce the appeal of the initiative for these countries that have 
substantial energy reserves and do not urgently require FDI. Other potential explanations 
for their lack of interest could be related to the common perception of the EITI as a club 
for poor African countries or as an agent of Western influence (Munje, 2014).  
5.	Conclusion	and	Policy	Implications	
 
Various forms of external influences attempt to initiate political and economic reforms in 
developing countries. In the last decade, international financial institutions and global 
advocacy networks have promoted transparency to facilitate better decisions, policies, 
and processes without necessarily causing a fundamental shift in the political regime. In 
resource-rich countries, the EITI emerged as the most effective mechanism for ensuring 
transparency in government revenues from hydrocarbons and minerals. The EITI is 
increasingly more popular; however the literature lacks an underlying mechanism of its 
membership patterns that can explain why states volunteer to disclose their precious 
revenues.   
As one of the first comprehensive comparative studies on the EITI, the results in 
this paper show that EITI membership is correlated with lower levels of income and 
higher levels of resource dependency, corruption, and FDI inflows. In particular, the 
impact of FDI is crucial in explaining policy decisions on revenue transparency, since 
other variables are unlikely to fluctuate strongly in the short run. As the case of 
Seychelles shows, even the prospect of petroleum extraction can initiate the membership 
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process in the existence of high FDI inflows. Improved bilateral relations with Western 
states and international firms, and having access to supply chains offer additional 
resources to domestic actors, motivating them to signal their commitment to 
transparency. This process of signaling for material benefits can apply to any norm 
diffusion process, including promotion of human rights and environmental advocacy.  
The results also imply that while industrialized countries join the initiative to 
setup examples for developing states, many corrupt governments apply for membership 
as a gesture to appease foreign investors. They signal adherence to western initiated 
norms without necessarily changing actual practices, a process known as mock 
compliance (Walter, 2008). This paper contributes to this literature, first by documenting 
its presence in extractive industries and second by introducing competition as an 
underlying mechanism. 
Finally, the implications of this research raise doubts about the potential ability of 
the EITI as an engine of transparency reforms in resource-rich countries. The EITI does 
have the potential to be a wedge if elites in member states eventually internalize the norm 
of transparency via different mechanisms of socialization. However, the present 
evaluation of membership patterns highlights a rather utilitarian use of the EITI by 
corrupt governments.  
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